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Abstract
Utilizing a rich survey data collected in the Southern part of the Philip-
pines, this paper examines the time allocation of wives within the collec-
tive household framework by investigating not only the role of socioe-
conomic factors but also the influence of various intrahousehold power
indicators. Analysis of autonomy and finality of intrahousehold decisions
discloses that decisions are not unilaterally decided by a single household
member, a result which confirms the prediction of collective household
framework. Adopting a simple test procedure, this paper also examines
which of the competing household models, collective or unitary, best de-
scribes these Philippine time use data. Testing results lend support to the
validity of the collective household framework.
1 Introduction
Time allocation of individuals, mostly the analysis of labor supply behavior, has
occupied a fair share in the literature of labor economics, bulk of which has been
done under the assumption that the family acts as one unit to achieve a single
objective. This treatment is not problematic as long as either all household
members have the same preferences or there exists a dictator in the family.
However, household reality, such as dissolution of marriage and siblings’ dispute
over parental bequests and properties would illustrate that such representation
is overly simple. Hence, the collective household framework, which recognizes
different preferences among household members, has been developed.
This paper investigates the determinants of wives’ time allocation and tests
which household model, collective or unitary, best describes these Philippine
time use data. Collective framework operates under very few assumption, save
for pareto efficiency. Hence, studies concerning efficiency in the allocation of
resources under one person’s command amount to proving or disputing the
collective setting as an adequate alternative to the unitary model. In the present
study, the resource in question is time. Though this is not the first to analyze
time use within the competing household models, studies of Seaton (1997),
Barmby and Smith (2001) and Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) for example
deal only with labor supply.
While it is ideal that time allocation for both husband and wife be analyzed,
the data available are limited to women only. This should not become a seri-
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ous hurdle since bulk of the evidence shows specialization of time use according
to gender (see for example Mueller, 1984 and Jacoby, 1992). This is also in-
dicated by the preliminary investigation on the patterns of responsibilities in
Cebu households. Table 1 presents various household activities and the propor-
tion of household members who usually perform the tasks. It reveals that, even
for this sample consisting mainly of urban observations, there is an indication of
male-female household work dichotomy. Among the household tasks considered,
repairing jobs appear to be the only activity that big proportion of husbands are
inclined to perform. Food shopping, food preparation, house cleaning, buying
and washing clothes and child care are responsibilities primarily delegated to
wives who appear to obtain help from children.
The time use analysis is conducted for two subsamples, working and nonworking.
To the extent that there are unobservable attributes among the subsamples that
systematically influence the manner with which they allocate time, then we are
faced by inconsistent estimates. Hence, we also provide estimation of time use
corrected for sample selection. While this study is not the first to correct time
use estimation for sample selection (see for example, Kooreman and Kapteyn,
1987), studies that have done so are few and within the context of intrahousehold
relationships, even fewer. Results reveal that there is indeed sample selection.
In particular, working wives have tastes for activities that both have work and
leisure components vis-a´-vis activities that are in the extreme of the time use
spectrum. In contrast, results on nonworking wives suggest that they have tastes
for pure leisure (i.e. recreation) vis-a´-vis partial leisure (i.e. tending).
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the theoretical frame-
work and the data; section 4 investigates the autonomy and finality of various
intrahousehold choices; section 5 discusses the effects of correcting for sample
selection and presents the testing results for both subsamples; section 6 sum-
marizes and concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
Assume that the household utility is represented by U(Ch, Cw, X
i
h, X
i
w; d) where
C is consumption of goods, X is consumption of time and d is a vector of
demographic characteristics. X may be spent on various activities such as
recreation (Xr), child care (Xcc), household chores (Xhc) and working (Xw).
Within the unitary framework, the household is faced by the budget constraint,
pC + Wh
∑
Xih +Ww
∑
Xiw = WhT + WwT + Y , where the left hand side is
the total consumption and all the nonmarket time has wage as price. Maxi-
mization yields the demand for the various consumption of time and the com-
posite commodity demand which take on the following general form: Xij =
Xij(Wh,Ww, Y ; d) and C = C(W
h,Ww, Y ; d) where j is an index for husband or
wife. Cross-section data is utilized so the assumption of commodity price being
equal to unity is tenable.
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Within the collective setting, household allocation is a result of a two-stage bud-
geting process. The first stage consists of household allocation of the nonlabor
income to each members according to a sharing rule. The second stage involves
the individual allocation of his share to his own time and commodity consump-
tion. Within this framework, the wife is faced by the following maximization
problem in the second stage:
max
(c,Xi)
U(Cw, X
i
w; d) subject to pC +Ww
∑
Xiw = WwT + φw (2.1)
where φw is the share the wife obtains from the first stage. We follow Quisumb-
ing and Maluccio (2003) and assume that φ = φ(ah, aw) where ai’s are measures
of intrahousehold power of husband and wife. The wife’s demand for various
consumption of time and the composite commodity demand in this case have
the following general form:
Xi = Xi(Ww, φw(ah, aw); d) (2.2)
C = C(Ww, φw(ah, aw); d) (2.3)
The budget constraint allows us to drop one equation. To focus on time use, we
therefore opt to drop the commodity demand. Differentiate equation 2.2 with
respect to the husband and wife’s intrahousehold power:
∂Xi
∂aj
=
∂Xi
∂φw
∂φw
∂aj
(2.4)
where i represents various wife’s time use and j indicates husband or wife. Chi-
appori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) have proposed a test for pareto efficiency, the
distribution factor proportionality, which states that the ratios of the marginal
effects of the bargaining power/distribution factors on labor supply should be
equal. While their test has been derived for testing labor supply efficiency be-
tween husband and wife, the principle remains valid within the present context.
From equation 2.4 and using the distribution factor proportionality result of
Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002):
∂Xhc/∂ah
∂Xhc/∂aw
=
∂Xcc/∂ah
∂Xcc/∂aw
=
∂Xw/∂ah
∂Xw/∂aw
=
∂Xr/∂ah
∂Xr/∂aw
(2.5)
Equation 2.5 constitutes the test for the collective model. Within the unitary
setting, none of the bargaining power/distribution factors figure in any of the
intrahousehold decision processes: ∂Xi/∂aj = 0. This constitutes the test for
the unitary model.
3 Data
The testing procedure above is implemented on the Cebu Longitudinal Health
and Nutrition Survey (CLHNS), which is mainly composed of samples from
urban areas in the southern part of the Philippines. This survey, conducted
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by the Carolina Population Center-University of North Carolina together with
collaborators1 in the Philippines has been conceptualized to study infant feeding
patterns of mothers who gave birth between May 1, 1983 to April 30, 1984.
Since then, a portion of the original 3327 mothers have been resurveyed in
1991-1992, 1994-1995 and 1998-1999. While the survey has retained the focus
of health and nutrition of both mother and child, information on intrahousehold
decisions have been added on the recent survey waves. In the 1994-1995 resurvey,
intrahousehold relationships have been collected, information that are vital to
the analysis of collective models. There are, however, very few information
gathered concerning other household members, with the exception of member’s
wage income, highest grade completed, age and sex. Detailed data include
the following: characteristics of the index child and his/her siblings, children’s
diet, IQ, food records and various tests on cognitive skills; characteristics, diet,
reproductive history and activities of the mother. Information on household
decision-making and sources of nonlabor income are also available.
4 Household Decisions: Autonomy and Finality
The increasing acceptance of the collective approach has paved the way for
recent intrahousehold studies to incorporate the role of distribution factors and
bargaining power measures. Distribution factors are factors that do not affect
preferences or the household budget set but do affect the decision process. In the
literature, these include sex ratio and divorce laws and asset ownership/property
rights. Most commonly used distribution factors, which qualify as human capital
brought to marriage, are age and education difference between couples. Deemed
to provide a clue on the bargaining strengths of individuals within the household,
these variables are used in drawing inferences on the efficiency of intrahousehold
resource allocation.
In this section, we examine various choices intrahousehold outcomes by conduct-
ing a simple investigation in autonomy and finality of intrahousehold decisions
concerning wide range of issues. While the use of distributions factors have
become common in commodity demand/expenditures analysis and have gained
grounds in household labor supply estimation, studies on how distribution fac-
tors affect other equally important intrahousehold decisions are wanting mainly
due to the lack of detailed information in most survey data, save for household
level consumption and expenditures. The Cebu dataset, however, is one ex-
ception where one block of the questionnaire is devoted to household decisions.
Mothers are presented several situations and they are asked who they usually
consult with. If they consult anyone from the household members, they are
then asked whose words usually prevail. These information allow us to draw
inference on the bargaining strengths of couples without having to recover the
sharing rule.
Tabulation of issues and decision makers are presented in table 2 in the ap-
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pendix. The sample used in the tabulation is limited to married mothers only
and hence we refer to these samples as wives. From table 2, it can be observed
that most wives do not consult with anybody from the household if the deci-
sion concerns low ticket expenditures such as purchase of her shoes or children’s
clothing. In general however, consultation with spouse appears to be the prac-
tice. Among those who consult, the figures show that most wives have the final
word on their own account purchases. High ticket expenditures, issues concern-
ing children’s welfare, family planning and hiring of household help appear to
be jointly decided by couples in most households. Nevertheless, there are sig-
nificant proportion of either husband or wife prevailing in the decision. This is
especially so on the choice of a working wife or her travels outside Cebu. These
statistics alone indicate that the unitary framework might be an oversimplified
characterization of what is going on within the household.
To pave the way for the empirical analysis, we assume that U∗ represents a
person’s cardinal measure of his utility and that U∗ = β′xi + εi where xi is a
vector of observable characteristics and ε captures the unobservable factors. U∗
is unobserved but U , which we assume to represent the person’s ordinal measure
of utility, is and the higher the value it takes, the higher his satisfaction level. In
the context of decision making process, we assume that one prefers autonomy
at best or if some consultation is needed, one prefers that the final decision be
his. From the wife’s perspective: U = 0 if husband is the final decision maker,
U = 1 if both husband and she are the final decision maker, U = 2 if she is the
final decision maker and U = 3 if she autonomously decides.
Following Greene (2000), U may be written such that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between U and U∗ and the rankings preserved. Assuming that
εi has normal distribution, the appropriate estimation method is ordered probit.
The xis include the differences of husband and wife’s age, education and wage.
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Dummies for wives’ headship, couple residing with the wife’s parents, urban
areas and barangay3 are also included. Marginal effects of these variables are
then computed.
Results concerning household expenditures are presented in table 3. It can be
observed that the wage difference and the dummy for wives’ headship consis-
tently appear to have marginal effects greater than zero in all the expenditure
decisions considered. In particular, for both low and high cost items the higher
the (predicted log) wage difference, the less likely it is for wives to autonomously
decide and the more likely it is for husbands to be the final decision makers.
While it has positive impact on P (U = 2) for purchases on wives’ and chil-
dren’s accounts, it can be observed that the marginal effect of wage difference
on P (U = 0) is greater than P (U = 2). These imply that a household decision
maker’s higher earning power works to his advantage. Wives’ headship, on the
other hand, has positive marginal effect on P (U = 3) concerning purchases on
her and the children’s account. It also has positive effect on P (U = 2) con-
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cerning purchase of gifts to relatives. Concerning big ticket items, however, it
appears that it has negative marginal effect on P (U = 3) and P (U = 2) and
positive marginal effect on P (U = 1) and P (U = 0). This imply that headship
does not preclude household discussions on major sale or purchase of house-
hold assets although it can be observed that its marginal effect on P (U = 1)
is greater than P (U = 0) indicating that wives’ headship, while it does not
grant her autonomy or finality, it does include her from being part of the final
decision. Households located in urban areas, on the other hand, have positive
marginal effects on both P (U = 0) and P (U = 1) though it appears that urban
households favor husbands more as the final decision maker on high expenditure
items. The same observations can be said when couples live together with wives’
parent/s.
Concerning various issues, table 4 indicates again that the marginal effect of
wage difference is greater than zero in almost all the issues considered. In
particular, there appears to be a consensus of negative effect on P (U = 3),
P (U = 2) and P (U = 1) and a positive effect on P (U = 0) indicating once
more that higher earning capacity grants a person a higher chance of being the
final decision maker. Wives’ headship dummy also affects the probabilities in
the same pattern discussed above. On the other hand, the presence of wives’
parent/s appear to have favorable effect on either P (U = 2) and P (U = 1) while
urban dummy has favorable impact on P (U = 1) concerning children’s school,
working wife and wife’s travel outside Cebu.
Concerning money matters, table 5 reveals that the higher the wage difference
between husbands and wives, the more likely that the wives decide on their
own money and the more likely for husbands’ either partial or full remittance.
Wives’ headship, the presence of the wives’ parents in the household and house-
hold located in urban areas allow wives to decide over their own money. In
addition, wives’ headship and urban dummies have positive impact on either
full or partial remittance though it is clear that both have higher impact on the
former. In under no issues considered can the marginal effects of nonlinearities
in age difference be detected.
Based on the results, wage difference has been a consistent significant explana-
tory variable in all of the intrahousehold issues considered. In particular, it
appears that higher earnings allow one to exert influence in the autonomy and
finality of intrahousehold decisions. While wives’ headship does not grant wives
autonomy and finality in decision making, it does allow them to be part of the
final decisions. This may suggest that headship does not automatically pre-
clude others from being part of the decision. In fact, one may believe that it
is the head’s responsibility to initiate communication and consolidate opinions
as means of strengthening intrahousehold relationships. The presence of wives’
parents in the household also does not grant wives autonomy of decision. Rather,
it appears to favor joint decision making suggesting that there may be parents’
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role in balancing, rather than tilting, the fulcrum of intrahousehold power. This
is also observed regarding the effects of urban dummy. This is not surprising
given that urban areas are more progressive and more liberal compared to rural
areas where patriarchal and conservative households may still abound.
Depending on the issues, this exercise illustrates that autonomy and finality of
intrahousehold decisions are affected by the distribution factors. These results
indicate that the household decisions are not unilaterally decided by a single
household member. This is in sharp contrast with what the representation of
unitary models would have us believe.
5 Time Use Analysis
To facilitate the estimation of women’s time use and the testing procedure
described in section 2, we hypothesize that time allocation is affected by so-
cioeconomic and intrahousehold power indicators and formulate the following
estimating equation:
Ti = α0 + α1age+ α2noeduc+ α3maidnum+ α4ageoldestch+ α5nuclear
+ α6hhmother + α7roomnum+ α8othincom+ α9predlogwage+ α10fullimit
+ α11nolimit+ ψ1pwordtravel2 + ψ2pmaid+ ψ3pspendfather + ε
(5.1)
where i represents the time spent on the ith activity. Demographic variables
include age (age) and a dummy for no education (noeduc). Several variables
deemed to affect the wife’s productivity at home are included: number of house-
hold help (maidnum), age of the oldest child (ageoldestch), dummy for nuclear
household (nuclear) and number of rooms in the house (roomnum). Nonla-
bor income (othincom), wage (predlogwage) and headship (hhmother) are also
expected to affect time use. In addition, dummies of physical constraints to
perform various tasks are included (fullimit and nolimit). Partially limited
capacity is the left out category. ε is the residual term.
From the preceding section, human capital brought to marriage such as age and
education are utilized to estimate the probabilities of autonomy and finality of
decisions concerning various household issues. To the extent that these prob-
abilities capture the decision process within the household, these may serve as
indicators of bargaining strengths between couples. For example, the high prob-
ability of a husband having the final words on working wife is indicative that
he exerts strong influence over household decisions. Since we have no reason
to believe that these probabilities are endogenous to time use, the outcome be-
ing investigated, the following indicators of intrahousehold powers are utilized:
probability of husband having the final decision on wife’s travel outside Cebu
(pwordtravel2), probability of wife autonomously deciding on hiring household
help (pmaid) and the probability of husband deciding how wife’s money should
be spent (pspendfather). High probability of husband having the final decision
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on wife’s travels and over wife’s money are indicators of high intrahousehold
power of husbands; high probability of wife’s autonomous decision hiring house-
hold help is indicator of high intrahousehold power of wives.
Equation 5.1 is jointly estimated for two subsamples: working and nonworking
wives. For the nonworking samples, time use is partitioned into four groups:
child care, recreation, household chores and tending gardens/animals. For the
working sample, time spent working is added as additional category. Recre-
ation includes napping, watching tv, gambling, embroidering and talking with
neighbors. Child care are activities performed to/with children such as bathing
them, dressing them up, helping then with home works and taking them for a
walk. Household chores are combinations of time spent on food preparation and
housekeeping while tending includes watering plants or feeding/bathing animals.
The working category is further divided into working at home and working out-
side of home. Working at home includes opening/closing stores and doing other
people’s laundry. We assume that working is on the one extreme of time use
and recreation is on the other extreme with child care, tending and household
chores in between. This imply that activities in between the extremes have both
work and leisure components. Summary statistics of the variables used in the
estimation are presented in table 6.
Given that supplying labor to the wage market or working is just one component
of time use, selection bias may also exist in time use estimation when limiting the
sample to, say, working or nonworking samples. Selection bias occurs when esti-
mation using observed wages and hours worked does not take into account sam-
ple censoring (Heckman, 1979). To see this, suppose that the time use and wage
earner functions are Tj = α
′xi + ui and P = γ′wi + vi respectively. Assuming
that ui and vi have bivariate normal distribution, E(Tj |wife is wage earner) =
α′xi + E(ui|vi > −zi) where zi = γ
′wi
σv
. If E(ui|vi > −zi) is not equal to zero,
then we are faced with inconsistent estimates. This happens when there are
unobservable characteristics among the wage earners that influence the manner
in which they allocate their time resources. Indeed, it is hardly surprising that
people who have strong inclination to earn or supply labor to the wage market
are the ones less likely to devote time in housekeeping.
To address this, the estimation procedure adopted in this section consists of the
following steps:
1. Conduct a probit estimation having dependent variable coded 1 if the
individual is a wage earner, 0 otherwise. All observations are utilized.
Compute the inverse of the Mills’ Ratio relevant to the truncation point
(see Greene, 2000 p899).
2. Conduct (log of) wage regression including the inverse of Mills’ Ratio
computed from step 1 as regressor. Predict wage. Sample is limited to
working wives only.
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3. Conduct time use regression including the relevant inverse of Mills’ Ratio
computed from step 1 and the predicted wage computed from step 2 as
regressors.
Estimates
Working Sample
Results4, presented in table 7, indicate that extra hands allow wives to pursue
activities outside the confines of her homemaker responsibilities. This may be
inferred from the positive(negative) effect of the number of maids to recreation
and working outside of home(household chore). This is also supported by the
positive(negative) impact of the age of the oldest child to recreation(child care,
household chores and tending). In addition, wives who belong to nuclear house-
holds devote less time in recreation and more time in household chores. That
there are attached responsibilities to being a household head finds support from
the negative(positive) effect of the dummy for wives’ headship on her recreation
and working outside of home(child care and working at home).
Dummies for capacity to perform household tasks reveal that physical well be-
ing may also play an important role in time allocation. Wives with full limita-
tion spend more time tending while those without limitation spend more time
in household chores suggesting that tending gardens/animals, at least for this
sample, may have high leisure component. Travel time has negative effect on
time spent on activities other than working outside of home. These may mean
that, given higher travel time, wives maximize their time in the work place to
avoid back lags on work that entail additional time spent away from other and
possibly more pleasurable activities.
While nonlabor income negligible effects, the log of wage negatively affects recre-
ation and tending activities which both have work and leisure components and
positively affects working at home and outside of home. These results are in
line with Mueller’s (1984) hypothesis that time allocations are responsive to
economic incentives.
High intrahousehold power of husbands, assumed to be indicated by high pword-
travel2, has negative effect on household chores, an activity which, as presumed
above, may have leisure component as well. On the other hand, high pspendfa-
ther, another indicator of husband’s intrahousehold power, has negative impact
on recreation but has positive effect on tending and working at home. These
may suggest that time allocation responds to intrahousehold indicators depend-
ing on which source the power is coming from. For example, when there is a high
probability of husbands’ deciding over wives’ money, results indicate that wives
spend less time working outside but spend more time working at home where
the flow of income can be easily monitored or controlled. As a consequence
of devoting more time working at home, activities having leisure components
are also undertaken. In contrast, pmaid, an indicator of wives’ intrahousehold
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power, has positive effect on recreation and working outside of home and neg-
ative impact on child care and working at home. Working outside is preferred
than working at home possibly because of the prestige attached to institution
affiliation or possibly because of the satisfaction one may derive simply from
dressing up.
The sample selection term (mills) is negative and significant on recreation and
working outside of home and is positive and significant in child care and tending.
These indicate the presence of sample selection effects in these time uses and
its inclusion has corrected the bias induced by sample selection. Following the
interpretation of Dolton and Makepeace (1989) concerning the sign of mills,
results indicate that wives who are more likely to become wage earners are
the ones less likely to spend more time at work and at pure leisure relative
to those who are less likely to become wage earners. Studies concerned with
labor supply categorize time use into two groups, work and leisure, and hence
their interpretation of mills has an automatic implication on leisure. Ham
(1982) for example, has concluded based on the correlation coefficients between
the labor supply and probit estimations that “...both the unemployed and the
underemployed possess below average tastes for leisure...”. However, based on
our results, mills is actually negative for both work and leisure and positive for
activities with both leisure and work component such as child care and tending.
These suggest that one should not be too quick in drawing conclusions when the
view is partial which also imply the importance of time use analysis even if one
is interested only in one of its components. In addition, the results suggest that
there are unobservable attributes among the working wives that are correlated
with the manner in which they allocate time. It appears that they have tastes
for activities that both have work and leisure components vis-a´-vis activities
that are in the extreme of the time use spectrum.
Non-Working Sample
For the non-working sample, personal characteristics, such as age, appear to
affect time use as well. For example, results in table 10 show that older wives
devote less(more) time in child care(recreation and household chores). Extra
hands, assumed to be captured by the number of maids and the age of the
oldest child, appear to negatively affect household chores and positively affect
recreation respectively. This is supported by the positive effect of the nuclear
dummy in household chore. As in the working sample, these results indicate
that extra hands allow wives to devote time away from her household responsi-
bilities. Headship has negative(positive) effect on recreation(tending). Similar
to the working sample, nonlabor incomes are insignificant in all the time uses
considered.
Results on whether she has physical constraints in performing various tasks
reveal that wives with full limitation spend more time in pure leisure and less
time in household chores while wives with no limitations spend more time in
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child care.
Strong wives’ intrahousehold power, presumed to be indicated by the high prob-
ability of her autonomous hiring household help decisions, has negative effect on
household chores and tending and positive impact on recreation. Strong intra-
household power of husbands, presumed to be indicated by the high probability
of power over wife’s money, has positive effect on tending and negative impact
on recreation. The probability of husband’s final decision on wife’s travels, also
an indicator of husbands’ strong intrahousehold power, on the other, does not
have significant effects to any of the time use considered. In general, results
indicate that time allocation of nonworking wives also responds to bargaining
indicators in a manner predicted by the collective household theory.
Since there is no observable wage for the non-working sample, we skip step 2
in the procedure enumerated in section 5 and computed the relevant mills for
the non wage earners. Results are presented in table 10. For this non-working
sample, mills has negative impact on recreation, meaning wives who are less
likely to become wage earners are the ones more likely to spend more time in
pure leisure and performing household chores. Similarly, they are also the ones
less likely to spend more time in tending and child care. Again, these suggest
that there are unobservable characteristics (i.e. innate laziness, aversion to
strenuous tasks) among the non-working samples that are correlated to their
time allocation. It appears that they have taste for pure leisure (i.e. recreation)
vis-a´-vis partial leisure (i.e. tending) and if they do perform household tasks,
they choose the task requiring less time and responsibilities (household chores
vis-a´-vis child care).
Testing Results
Working Sample
To evaluate the implication of the unitary model, linear Wald tests are con-
ducted on the following null hypothesis: ψ1 = ψ2 = ψ3. Rejection of these
hypothesis indicates that intrahousehold power of husbands and wives have dif-
ferent impact on the outcomes in question, a result that sharply contrasts with
the prediction of unitary models. These tests are performed across time use
equations. Full cross equation testing, ψi1 = ψ
i
2 = ψ
i
3, where i represent various
time uses, are also conducted. Results are presented in table 8. The off diago-
nals are cross equation testing while the figures on the diagonal are testing on
that particular equation alone. The last column (labelled overall) represents
the full testing of the hypotheses across equation. Tests on household chores
indicate that the null hypotheses cannot be rejected. The same holds true for
the cross tests between child care & household chores. The rest of the test in-
dicates that the null hypotheses are all rejected. Overall tests allow us to claim
the same conclusion.
To evaluate the implication of the collective model, nonlinear Wald test are con-
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ducted on the following null hypothesis: ψ1/ψ2 = ψ3/ψ2. Full cross equation
testing, ψi1/ψ
i
2 = ψ3/ψ
i
2, where i represent various time uses, is also conducted.
Rejection of these hypotheses indicates the rejection of Pareto efficiency, a cru-
cial assumption of collective models. Results, presented in table 9, appear to
indicate that the hypothesis of efficiency is rejected in the cross tests between
recreation & working outside and tending & working at home. Overall test,
however, indicates that the hypothesis cannot be rejected. These may be taken
as an evidence to the efficiency of working wives’ time allocation to various
activities.
Nonworking Sample
Tests results of the unitary implication are presented in table 11. These indicate
that the null hypothesis is rejected in all time use tests, save for the child
care. Overall tests indicate the same conclusion. Tests results on the collective
implication are presented in table 12. These show that while the hypothesis is
rejected in the cross test between recreation & tending, results on the overall
tests indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis. As in the working
sample, the time allocations of nonworking wives are also efficient.
6 Summary
This paper has utilized human capital brought to marriage as distribution fac-
tors deemed to affect various intrahousehold choices. Results indicate that
higher earnings allow one to exert influence in the autonomy and finality of
intrahousehold decisions. While wives’ headship does not grant wives auton-
omy and finality in decision making, it does allow them to be part of the final
decisions. This may suggest that headship does not automatically preclude
others from being part of the decision. The presence of wives’ parents in the
household also does not grant wives autonomy of decision. Rather, it appears
to favor joint decision making suggesting that there may be parents’ role in
balancing, rather than tilting, the fulcrum of intrahousehold power. Results
on the various intrahousehold decisions considered indicate that the household
decisions are not unilaterally decided by a single household member. This is in
sharp contrast with what the representation of unitary models would have us
believe. The distribution factors used, however, are limited. Future data col-
lection on household surveys should therefore include not only data on decision
makers on various intrahousehold issues but information on assignable assets
and individual income sources as well.
This paper has also analyzed the determinants of time allocation of working and
nonworking wives by including as explanatory variables not only socioeconomic
factors but also some intrahousehold power indicators. This is in the attempt
to extend the time use model in the collective household framework. Results
indicate that time allocations respond to both factors as predicted by the theory.
Various tests conducted to verify that intrahousehold power indicators do not
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affect time allocation reveal that this is rejected. This may be taken to imply
the rejection of unitary model. Various tests conducted to verify efficiency, on
the other hand, support the validity of collective model.
Notes
1Collaborating institutions are Nutrition Center of the Philippines, Office of the Population
Studies and the University of San Carlos.
2Wages are predicted from the maximum likelihood estimation. Estimates are available
from the author upon request.
3Barangay is the basic political unit in the Philippines and is roughly equivalent to a
village.
4Time use estimates without sample correction are available from the author upon request.
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Table 5: Marginal Effects of the Explanatory Variables Concerning Money Matters
Who Decides How Wife’s Does Husband Remit
Money Should be Spent? Income to Wife?
Husband Both Wife Zero Part Full
Decides Decide Decides Remittance Remittance Remittance
Age Difference 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001
Square of Age Difference 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Education Difference 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 0.005 -0.001 -0.004
(Predicted) Log of Wage Difference -0.031 0.013 0.018 -0.044 0.008 0.036
Dummy:
Mother’s Headship -0.129 -0.020 0.149 0.009 -0.024 0.016
Co-Residence with Wife’s Parents -0.010 -0.012 0.022 0.000 -0.001 0.001
Urban -0.001 -0.006 0.008 0.002 -0.019 0.018
Observations 2082 2092
The sum of the marginal effects of each variables should be equal to zero. However, some do not
add up due to rounding.
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Three-Stage Least
Squares Time Use Estimation
Working Sample Nonworking Sample
Variables Mean SD Mean SD
Dependent Variables:
Recreation 3.038 2.176 5.878 2.891
Child Care 1.015 1.303 2.544 2.584
Household Chores 3.714 1.954 6.535 2.215
Tending 0.247 0.531 0.400 0.799
Working at Home 2.841 3.975
Working Outside of Home 5.084 4.878
Explanatory Variables:
Age 37.926 5.898 37.578 6.052
No Education 0.016 0.126 0.027 0.163
Number of Maids 0.141 0.466 0.064 0.271
Age of the Oldest Child 15.591 4.727 15.334 4.801
Nuclear Family 0.676 0.468 0.723 0.448
Mother is the Household Head 0.044 0.205 0.047 0.213
Number of Rooms 2.806 1.240 2.664 1.224
Nonlabor Income 10787 35619 14441 42863
(Predicted) Wage 4.465 0.420
Full Limitation due to Health Problems 0.003 0.058 0.005 0.074
No Limitation due to Health Problems 0.972 0.165 0.961 0.195
Travel Time 0.213 0.354
Probability of Husband Having the Final Decision over Wife’s Travels 29.909 7.825 29.822 7.696
Probability of Wife Autonomously Deciding on Hiring Household Help 19.403 8.364 18.349 8.006
Probability of Husband Deciding how Wife’s Money Should be Spent 2.495 1.265 2.433 1.348
Mills 0.508 0.128 -1.097 0.190
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Table 7: Wife’s Time Use: Working Sample, Corrected for Sample Selection
Recreation Child Care Household Tending Working Working
Chore at Home Outside Home
Age 0.023** -0.028* 0.010** 0.010* -0.030** 0.031**
(0.014) (0.008) (0.012) (0.003) (0.023) (0.027)
No Education -0.790 -0.220 0.230 -0.171 0.941 0.180
(0.499) (0.281) (0.431) (0.119) (0.851) (0.974)
Number of Maids 0.427* 0.057 -0.861* -0.050 -0.287 0.775*
(0.147) (0.083) (0.127) (0.035) (0.251) (0.287)
Age of the Oldest Child 0.038** -0.024** -0.035** -0.010** 0.044 0.011
(0.017) (0.010) (0.015) (0.004) (0.029) (0.034)
Nuclear Family -0.244*** -0.088 0.485* 0.047 0.074 -0.204
(0.145) (0.082) (0.126) (0.035) (0.248) (0.284)
Mother is the Household Head -1.518* 0.612* -0.044 0.159 1.923* -1.348***
(0.424) (0.238) (0.366) (0.101) (0.722) (0.826)
Number of Rooms -0.041 -0.021 0.093** 0.038* -0.042 -0.073
(0.055) (0.031) (0.048) (0.013) (0.094) (0.108)
Nonlabor Income 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(Predicted) Log Wage -0.628* -0.097 -0.060 -0.072*** 0.558*** 0.659***
(0.182) (0.102) (0.157) (0.043) (0.310) (0.355)
Full Limitation 0.667 -0.546 -0.167 1.049* -1.441 -0.114
due to Health Problems (1.134) (0.638) (0.979) (0.270) (1.933) (2.213)
No Limitation 0.129 -0.356 0.803** 0.114 -0.186 -0.484
due to Health Problems (0.401) (0.226) (0.346) (0.096) (0.684) (0.783)
Travel Time 0.043 -0.513* -1.195* -0.180* -4.511* 6.896*
(0.177) (0.100) (0.153) (0.042) (0.302) (0.346)
Mills -1.304** 3.771* -0.569 0.650* 0.290 -4.170*
(0.522) (0.293) (0.450) (0.124) (0.889) (1.018)
Probability of Husband Having -0.001 -0.008 -0.018** -0.002 0.007 0.026
the Final Decision over Wife’s
Travels
(0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.017) (0.020)
Probability of Wife 0.032** -0.022* -0.016 -0.004 -0.063* 0.071*
Autonomously Deciding on Hir-
ing Household Help
(0.013) (0.007) (0.011) (0.003) (0.021) (0.025)
Probability of Husband -0.139** -0.042 -0.073 0.057* 0.241** -0.161
Deciding how Wife’s Money
Should be Spent
(0.056) (0.032) (0.049) (0.013) (0.096) (0.110)
Constant 4.913* 2.274* 4.430* -0.211 2.187 0.552
(1.053) (0.592) (0.909) (0.251) (1.795) (2.055)
R2 0.06 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.18 0.29
Observations 1185 1185 1185 1185 1185 1185
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
*/**/***Significant at 1/5/10 percent level.
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Table 8: Unitary Testing: Working Sample, Corrected for Sample Selection
Recreation Child Care Household Tending Working Working Overall
Chores Tending at Home out of Home
Recreation 15.99 21.11 17.35 36.78 28.24 28.73 66.71
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Child Care 5.59 6.91 25.82 12.7 28.23 55.48
(0.061) (0.141) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000)
Household Chores 1.36 23.16 14.5 22.43 45.79
(0.508) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
Tending 20.3 25.61 42.62 44.01
Garden/Animals (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Working for Pay 7.73 21.41 21.41
at Home (0.021) (0.000) (0.000)
Working for Pay 21.19 21.19
Outside Home (0.000) (0.000)
Figures in parentheses are p-values. Figures above the parentheses are Chi2.
Null hypothesis being tested is ψ1 = ψ2 = ψ3.
Table 9: Testing for Pareto Efficiency: Working Sample, Corrected for Sample
Selection
Child Care Household Tending Working Working Overall
Chores Tending at Home out of Home
Recreation 4.87 5.25 5.48 5.37 6.74 13.61
(0.18) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.08) (0.26)
Child Care 2.23 2.88 5.50 3.64 9.59
(0.53) (0.41) (0.14) (0.30) (0.39)
Household Chores 2.91 6.06 3.74 8.54
(0.41) (0.11) (0.29) (0.29)
Tending 6.19 3.74 7.43
(0.10) (0.29) (0.19)
Working for Pay at Home 5.40 5.40
(0.14) (0.14)
Figures in parentheses are p-values. Figures above the parentheses are Chi2.
Null hypothesis being tested is ψ1/ψ2 = ψ3/ψ2.
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Table 10: Wife’s Time Use: Nonworking Sample, Corrected for Sample Selection
Recreation Child Care Household Tending
Chores Garden/Animals
Age 0.038*** -0.052** 0.043** 0.006
(0.023) (0.020) (0.019) (0.007)
No Education 0.191 -0.158 -0.101 0.129
(0.610) (0.537) (0.496) (0.175)
Number of Maids 0.130 0.831** -0.630** -0.088
(0.373) (0.328) (0.303) (0.107)
Age of the Oldest Child 0.095* -0.078* -0.015 0.011
(0.030) (0.026) (0.024) (0.008)
Nuclear Family -0.287 -0.295 0.498* 0.070
(0.231) (0.203) (0.187) (0.066)
Mother is the Household Head -1.336*** -0.023 0.703 0.597*
(0.686) (0.603) (0.557) (0.197)
Number of Rooms -0.141*** 0.076 0.105 0.057**
(0.084) (0.074) (0.068) (0.024)
Nonlabor Income 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Full Limitation due 4.055* 0.771 -3.934* -0.131
to Health Problems (1.412) (1.242) (1.147) (0.406)
No Limitation due to Health Problems -0.339 0.763a 0.316 0.109
(0.536) (0.472) (0.436) (0.154)
Mills -5.337* 5.672* -1.544* 0.630*
(0.541) (0.476) (0.440) (0.155)
Probability of Husband Having 0.016 -0.010 0.006 0.000
the Final Decision over Wife’s Travels (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.005)
Probability of Wife Autonomously 0.050** -0.009 -0.042** -0.013**
Deciding on Hiring Household Help (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.006)
Probability of Husband -0.136*** -0.051 -0.050 0.131*
Deciding how Wife’s Money Should be
Spent
(0.081) (0.071) (0.066) (0.023)
Constant -3.112* 11.797* 3.304* 0.328
(1.281) (1.126) (1.041) (0.368)
R2 0.19 0.22 0.09 0.13
Observations 737 737 737 737
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
*/**/***Significant at 1/5/10 percent level.
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Table 11: Unitary Testing: Nonworking Sample, Corrected for Sample Selection
Recreation Child Care Household Chores Tending Overall
Recreation 7.7 13.95 17.79 46.25 66.29
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Child Care 0.33 11.9 40.81 54.32
(0.85) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Household Chores 10.92 51.78 51.78
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tending Garden/Animals 39.99 39.99
(0.00) (0.00)
Figures in parentheses are p-values. Figures above the parentheses are Chi2.
Null hypothesis being tested is ψ1 = ψ2 = ψ3.
Table 12: Testing for Pareto Efficiency: Nonworking Sample, Corrected for Sample
Selection
Child Care Household Chores Tending Overall
Recreation 2.58 3.64 7.03 10.50
(0.46) (0.30) (0.07) (0.16)
Child Care 1.00 5.19 6.88
(0.80) (0.16) (0.23)
Household Chores 5.92 5.92
(0.12) (0.12)
Figures in parentheses are p-values. Figures above the parentheses are nonlinear Chi2.
Null hypothesis being tested is ψ1/ψ2 = ψ3/ψ2.
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